Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

Sher Khan v. Perry Zolezzi, Inc. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Rich and Elton; Attorneys for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Khan v. Perry Zolezzi, Inc., No. 7346 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1123

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF n- ~~ STATE OF UTAH

.SHERKHAN,
Respotndent,

vs.

Case No.
7346·

PERRY ZOLEZZI, INC., a corporation,
Appellamt.

Brief of Appellant

L)b

1·~ ~RteH AND ELTON,

..__..........----·- ··------ ----AtMJ.r~ for Appellant.
ClER!(

~

PF. ~-~E COURl, UTI':

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX TO BRIE.F

Page

SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR ............ ---------------------------·········,··········· 26
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pleadings .............................................................................................
2
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.................................... 12
Judgments ·························-~---··················-························ ........... ...... 20
STATEMENT OF FACTS ·················································h··················· 21
POINT I.
The Trial Court Erred in Overruling Defendant's General and
Special Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint as Amended and
in Denying Defendant's 1\:Iotions to Require Plaintiff to
Elect Between Two Repugnant and Self-Destructive
Causes of Action ·-···························-····-······--···--·-·-····························

28

POINT II.
The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining, Without Leave to Amend,
Plaintiff's Demurrer to Defendant's Second Affirmative
Defense Alleging an Election of Remedies by Plaintiff
\Vhich Barred Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action......................

35

POINT III.
The Court Erred in Sustaining Plaintiff's General Demurrer to
Defendant's First Affirmative Defense to Defendant's
Second Cause of Action, Alleging Waiver, Estoppel and
Election of Remedy ..........................................................................

38

POINT IV.
The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Immaterial and Incompetent Evidence With Reference to Plaintiff's First Cause of
Action; and in Failing to Grant Defendant's Motion to
Strike the Same; and in Finding the Following Facts as to
the First Cause of Action: That by the Terms of a Certain
Promotion Agreement, Exhibit "B", the Promoters Undertook on Behalf of Defendant to Have Defendant Assume and
Pay the Note of Plaintiff; That by the Terms and Provisions of Said Exhibit "B" Defendant Assumed and Agreed
to Pay the Note of Plaintiff; That On or About July 27,
1946 and August 1, 1946 Defendant, As Part of the Consideration for Receipt of Certain Property From W. R.
Perry, Promised to Pay the Note of Plaintiff and Received
Said Property Upon an Undertaking to Apply the Property
to the Payment of Said Note; That PURSUANT TO SAID
PROMISE Defendant Made Entries Upon Its Own Books
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX -

Continued
Page

to Record the Fact That It Assumed the Note and That It
Agreed to Pay the Amount of Said Indebtedness to Plaintiff and That Defendant Thereby Assumed and Agreed to
Pay the Note to Plaintiff; That •PURSUANT TO SAID
PROMISE· Defendant on September 21, 1946 Did Pay to
Plaintiff $3,588.83 on the Note; That Perry, as President
and General Manager of Defendant Was Authorized to
Transact All of the Business of Defendant, Including the
Making of Said Payment; and in Concluding as a Matter
of Law on the First Cause of Action That Plaintiff Was
Entitled to Judgment for the Unpaid Amount of the Note,
Plus Interest and Attorneys Fees; and in Entering Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff and Against Defendant on the
First Cause of Action........................................................................ 43
POINT V.
The Trial Court Erred in Finding as a Fact That There Was
No Compliance With the Bulk Sales Law and That the
Sale by Perry to Defendant Was Void, and That Plaintiff
Did Not Receive His Proportionate Share of the Property
Conveyed Which Was Subject to the Bulk Sales Law; and
in Concluding as a Matter of Law That the Sale Was Void;
and in Entering Judgment For the Plaintiff on the Second
Cause of Action ---------······································································-·

56

POINT VI.
The Trial Court Erred in Making and Entering Inconsistent,
Repugnant and Self-Destructive Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgments on the Two Separate Counts 67

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX -

Continued

INDEX TO AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Page
Aggeller & ~fusser v. Blood, 75 Utah 120, 272 Pac. 933.................... 51
Andrew v. Rivers, 207 Ia. 343, 223 N. W. 102.................................... 40
Asbury v. Hugh L. Bates Lodge No. 686, F. & A. M., 62 Ohio
App. 430, 24 N. E. (2d) 638 ........................................................... 50, 52
Bank of A.merica Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n. v. Superior
Court of L. A. County, 20 Cal. (2d) 697, 128 Pac. (2d) 357....

68

Castleman v. Stryker, 109 Ore. 326, 219 Pac. 1081............................ 39
Chelsea Sales Corp. v. Jacobs, 193 So. 402.......................................... 39
Colen1an vs. Costello, 115 Kan. 463, 223 Pac. 289 .............................. 39, 74
Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535, 267 Pac. 1020.... 29, 74
Compton v. Jensen, 78 Utah 55, 1 Pac. (2d) 242................................ 55
Cook v. Covey Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 253 Pac. 196........ 36, 74
Darrah v. Lang, 119 Cal. App. 552, 6 Pac. (2d) 989..........................

72

Earl v. Roberts Fuel Oil, 147 Ore. 646, 35 Pac. (2d) 238................ 51
Electrical Prod. v. El Camp, Inc., 105 Mont. 386, 73 Pac. (2d) 199 51
Elggren v. Woolley, 64 Utah 183, 228 Pac. 906.................................. 52
Re Elliott (1942), 48 Fed. Supp. 146...................................................... 61
Farrell v. Paulus, 309 Mich. 441, 15 N. V/. (2d) 700........................ 61, 65
Grunow Memorial Clinic v. Davis, 49 Ariz. 277, 66 Pac. (2d) 238..

52

Hall v. Corinne, ------ Tex....... , 230 S. W. 823...................................... 61
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135
Pac. ( 2d) 919 -----------------------------------------·················---------------------------- 33
Henderson et ux v. Nixon, 66 Ida. 730, 168 Pac. (2d) 594.............. 73
Hood Rubber v. Dickey, 167 Okla. 304; 29 Pac. (2d) 115 .................. 61
I:Ioward v. Paulson, 41 Utah 490, 127 Pac. 284.................................. 37
Independent Oil & Gas Co. v. Shelton, 79 Utah 384, 6 Pac. (2d)
1027 --.------------... -----.............. ------.. --..................... --------------·. ... .. ... ........ ..

70

Jackson v. Bonneville Irr. Co., 66 Utah 404, 243 Pac. 107................

51

Kelly v. Gallo\vay, 156 Ore. 301, 68 Pac. (2d) 474 and 66 Pac.
(2d) 272 ········------------------------··················-··············----------------------------·
Kinney v. Yoelin Bros., 76 Colo. 136, 230 Pac. 127 ..........................39,
Kirkley v. Portland Elec. Power Co., 136 Ore. 421, 298 Pac. 237....
Knudson v. Adams, et al, 137 Cal. App. 261, 30 Pac. (2d) 608........

51
73
65
73

Lietchfield v. Heinicke, 200 Ia. 958, 205 N. W. 774............................
Lois Grunow Memorial Clinic v. Davis, 49 Ariz. 277, 66 Pac.
(2d) 238 ········································----------············································
Lutyen v. Ritchie, 37 Id. 473, 218 Pac. 430..........................................
Lynn v. Knob Hill Imp. Co., 177 Cal. 56, 169 Pac. 1009....................
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
52
69
34

INDEX -

Continued
Page

McCaffrey v. Town of Lake, 234 Wis. 251, 290 N. W. 283................

50

Marshall v. Leon, 267 Ill. App. 242......................................................
Mattecheck v. Pugh, 153 Ore. 1, 55 Pac. (2d) 730............................
Murry v. Monter, 90 Utah 105, 60 Pac. (2d) 960........................~·-·····

39
64
48

Nelson v. Sherwood, (Ill.) 258 Ill. App. 168........................................ 61
New Jersey Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bersick, 119 N. J. Law 68,
194 A. 438 ........................................................................................49, 51
Palo Sav. Bank v. Cameron, 184 Iowa 183, 168 N. W. 769.............. 39
Peppers v. Metzler, 71 Colo. 234, 205 Pac. 945 ............ ~ ..................... 35, 37
Perris v. Perris, ...... U ....... , 202 Pac. (2d) 731.................................... 62
Peterson Co. v. Freeburn, 204 Ia. 644, 215 N. W. 746........................ 61
Pike v. Clark, 95 Utah 235, 79 Pac. (2d) 1010.................................... 68
Powell v. Powell, ...... Utah ...... , 188 Pac. (2d) 736 ........................ 34, 74
Rand v. Columbian Realty Co., et al, 13 Cal. App. 444, 110
Pac. 322 .............................................................................................. 71
Re Elliott (1942), 48 Fed. Supp. 146..................................................... 61
Rice v. West, 80 Ore. 640, 157 Pac. 1105................................................ 42
Robison v. Robison, 57 U. 215, 203 Pac. 340 ........................................ 37
Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Mining Co., 69 Utah 41, 252 Pac. 276........ 62
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Com., 81 Utah 213, 17 Pac. (2d) 239.. 36
Schramm & Schmieg v. Shope, 200 Ia. 760, 205 N. W. 350, ........... 39, 40
Smith v. Steele Motor Co., 53 Id. 238, 22 Pac. (2d) 1070.................. 51
Starr Piano v. Scherer; 97 Ind. App. 77, 185 N. E. 665...................... 40
State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 Pac. (2d) 955...................................... 63
Swanson v. DeVine~ 49 U. 1, 160 Pac. 872............................................ 59
Tanner v. Sinoloa Land & Fruit Co., 43 Utah 14, 134 Pac. 586........
Taylor v. R. D. Scott & Co.,149 Mich. 525, 113 N.W. 32 ............. .49·;
Texas Hide & Leather Co. v. Bonds, 155 Okla. 3, 8 Pac. (2d) 20....
Torreyson v. Bumbaugh, 105 Mo. App. 435, 79 S. W. 1002..............

48
51
66
39

Ventrilla v. Tortorice, 160 La. 516, 107 So. 390 ..................................

61

Wall v. Mining & Smelting Co., 20 Utah 474, 59 Pac. 399................ 48
Walser v. Moran, 42 Nev. 111, 173 Pac. 1149...................................... 34
Warfield v. Krueger, 96 Cal. App. 671, 274 Pac. 764.......................... 34
Western Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated, 57 Utah 88
192 Pac. 664 ................................................................................. :.... 52
White v. Moore, 46 Ariz. 48, 46 Pac. (2d) 1077.................................. 65
Whitehouse v. Nelson, 43 Wash. 174, 86 Pac. 174.............................. 39
Whitson v. Pac. Nash Motor Co., 37 Id. 204, 215 Pac. 846-............... 35
:Wolfe v. Bellfuir Hat Co., 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 908 .................................. 39, 74

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TEXTS
1 American Juris. 469..............................................................................

32

41 American Juris. 534 ··································--·-·····------·---·------················
1 Bancroft Code Pleading 942, 943........................................................

32
34

37 C. J. S. 1328, Sec. 478 ··················-·······-·····---····------··························-38, 74
37 C. J. S. 1136, Sec. 305 ............... ·------·----·····················-----·-····--·····--···-··
37 c. J. s. 1337..........................................................................................

38
61

37 C. J. S. Sec. 481 (f)..............................................................................

66

50 American Juris. 244, Sec. 249 "Statutes"-·-··················-·-···-----··-·····

66

STATUTES REFERRED TO
33-2-1 U. C. A. 1943............·-·-···········-·····-························-············--·····-··

58

33-5-4 U. C. A. 1943.......................................... ---·--·······-·························

45

33-5-6 U. C. A. 1943.................................................................................. 46

Laws of Utah 1923, Page 172..................................................................

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

62

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHER KHAN,

Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
7346

PERRY ZOLEZZI, INC., a corporation,
Appellant.

Brief of Appellant
This is an appeal by Perry Zolezzi, Inc., a corporation, from two judgments entered December 30, 1948, on
both counts of plaintiff's complaint as amended, and
from the order of the trial court denying a motion for
new trial of said defendant. The action was commenced
against Perry Zolezzi, Inc., a corporation, and W. R.
Perry. The defendant Perry was never served with summons, did not appear in said action except as a witness
for plaintiff, and no judgment was taken against defendant W. R. Perry, the entire proceeding being against defendant Perry Zolezzi, Inc., a corporation, appellant
herein.

1
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PLEADINGS
Plaintiff's original (R. 1-3) complaint alleged that
on June 1, 1946, defendant W. R. Perry made, executed
and delivered to plaintiff his promissory note in the sum
of $18,588.83, payable on or about six months after date
at Eugene, Oregon, with interest at five per cent per
annum from date, with reasonable attorneys fees in case
suit· or action be instituted to collect the note. A copy
of the note was set forth in the complaint. It was further
alleged that on or about July 1, 1946, defendant corporation, for valuable consideration, promised to pay the
amount of said note to plaintiff, and that defendant corporation received property in the amount of the note from
defendant W. R. Perry upon an undertaking to apply it
pursuant to such promise, and to pay it to plaintiff. That
the defendant corporation thereby assumed and agreed
to pay the said note to plaintiff. That pursuant to such
promise the defendant corporation on September 21,
1946, did pay to plaintiff the sum of $3,588.83 to apply
upon said note and reduced the balance of the note to the
principal sum of $15,000. Plaintiff had demanded from
defendants, and each of them, said sum of $15,000, plus
interest, but that it had not been paid, and that the whole
thereof is past due and .owing, and that a reasonable sum
to be adjudged as attorneys fees is the sum of $1,500.00.
To this complaint defendant corporation interposed general and special demurrers, which were overruled. (R. 15, 16, 26).
2
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Defendant corporation thereupon filed its ans,ver,
alleging that it had no information sufficient to enable it
to ans,Yer the allegations as to the execution of said
promissory note by defendant ,V. R. Perry, and therefore
denied the same, admitted that defendant W. R. Perry,
without authority of defendant corporation, caused the
sum of $3,588.83 of the funds of defendant corporation
to be paid to plaintiff upon an obligation of said W. R.
Perry to plaintiff, and denied the remaining allegations
of said complaint. Defendant further answered and alleged that the purported obligation attempted to be set forth
and alleged in plaintiff's complaint is barred by the provisions of Section 33-5-4, U.C.A. 1943. (Statute o[
Frauds). (R. 27, 28)
Plaintiff thereupon, by leave of court, filed an amendment to his complaint by adding a second cause of action,
wherein as a second cause of action plaintiff alleged that
on or about July 1, 1946, defendant Perry sold, transferred and delivered all of the assets and business of said
W. R. Perry to defendant corporation for cash and
credits in the sum of $142,809.90, for the transfer to defendant Perry of $50,000 of the capital stock of defendant
corporation, which cash, credits and capital stock were
paid by defendant corporation. That the defendant corporation became a purchaser of stock of goods, wares and
merchandise in bulk from the said W. R. Perry otherwise
than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular
and usual prosecution of seller's business, and that it
did not demand from the seller at least five days previously thereto, and receive from the seller a statement.
I

3
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as provided for in Section 33-2-1, U.C.A. 1943, and
did not notify at least five days previously thereto
every creditor as shown by such verified statement
of the proposed sale or transfer, and the time
and condition of payment, and did not cause the purchase
money for sucli property to be applied ratably to the
payment of bona fide claims of creditors of said W. R.
Perry. That by the provisions of Section 33-2-2,
U.C.A. 1943, said sale to the defendant corporation was
fraudulent and void. That defendant corporation assumed
control over the assets of said W. R. Perry and sold and
disposed of said assets without paying to the creditors
their proportionate share of the full purchase price. That
said plantiff considered the said sale as being fraudulent and void and has attached the property of the defendant corporation. That a.t the time of said sale and
transfer the said W. R. Perry was indebted to plaintiff
as alleged in the first cause of action, and that the only
payment thereafter was the payment by defendant corporation to plaintiff of the sum of $3,588.83, leaving a
balance of $15,000, together with interest, which said
sum, together with interest, was not the proportionate
share of the purchase price to which plaintiff was entitled since the debts of defendant Perry, including the
debt to plaintiff, amounted to the sum of $142,809.90,
and the defendant W. R. Perry transferred assets to defendant corporation having an agreed and reasonable
value upon the date of transfer of $192,809.90. That the
assets transferred to defendant corporation by W. R.
Perry have now been sold and disposed of by defendant
corporation for a value in excess of the debts of W. R.
4
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Perry, and that the proceeds realized therefrom are suffieient to satisfy the debt o'ving to plaintiff. That plaintiff has made demand upon defendants, but the same
has not been paid, and that a reasonable attorneys fee is
the sum of $1500.00.
To plaintiff's complaint as amended defendant corporation interposed a g·eneral and special demurrer to
___ each alleged cause of action separately, and also to the
complaint as a 'vhole, upon the ground that several causes
of action are improperly united in said complaint as
amended (R. 55-56).
Defendant corporation also interposed a motion to
dismiss the second eause of action and for an order striking and expunging from said complaint as amended the
alleged second ·cause of action, and the whole thereof, or
in the ·alternative requiring and ordering plaintiff to
elecct between said alleged causes of action, as to which
of the same he will stand upon as the basis for
his remedy in said proceeding, upon the ground that the
alleged causes of action and remedies sought are inconsistent in that the alleged first cause of action and
remedies sought are inconsistent in that the alleged first
cause of action by its terms seeks to enforce and secure
the benefit for plaintiff of a purported contract, whereas
under the alleged second cause of action plaintiff
attempts to and seeks to repudiate, disavow and declare
null and void as to plaintiff the said transaction as referred to in the first cause of action (R. 57).

5
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Demurrer of defendant corporation was by the trial
court overruled and defendant's motion was denied by the
trial court on December 17, 1947 (R. 59).
Defendant corporation thereupon filed its answer to
plaintiff's second cause of action, wherein it admitted
upon information and belief that defendant W. R. Perry
was, prior to the 29th day of July, 1946, indebted to plaintiff upon a certain promissory note approximately as set
forth in plaintiff's first cause of action, and that said
W. R. Perry thereafter paid to plaintiff the sum of
$3,588.83 from the funds of defendant corporation to
apply thereon. Defendant corporation further admitted
upon information and belief that W. R. Perry had not
paid the balance· of said obligation. Defendant corporation further admitted that the assets transferred to defendant corporation by defendant W. R. Perry had now
been sold and disposed of by defendant corporation. The
remaining allegations of plaintiff's second cause of action were denied.
As a first separate defense to plaintiff's second
cause of action defendant corporation alleged that prior
to the 29th day of July 1946, defendant W. R. Perry was
indebted to certain secured and unsecured creditors in
the sum of approximately $164,000.00, including the
obligation to plaintiff; that Perry was the owner of certain real property valued at approximately $135,000.00,
subject to a mortgage in the sum of approximately $36,500.00, and certain supplies and accounts receivable
valued at approximately the sum of $30,000.00; that
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defendant corporation agreed "rith defendant W. R.
Perry that it "\VOuld lend to said vV. R. Perry the sum of
$50,000.00 and cause a mortg·a.ge in the sum of $80,000.00
to be placed upon the real property of defendant Perry
and assume and agree to pay said mortg·age and accept
ronveyanc.e of said real and personal property from W. R.
Perry as full payment for $50,000 of the common capital stock of defendant corporation, and issue to defendant
W. R. Perry, or his order, 50,000 shares of its common
capital stock; that it "-ras a part of said agreement that
said defendant W. R. Perry would, from said funds so to
be made available to him by defendant and from the personal funds of said \V. R. l=>erry, pay and discharge or
cause to be paid and discharged by payment or compromise, or otherwise, all of said debts and obligations
.... of said defendant W. R. Perry; that it 'vas further a part
of said agreement that said Perry was to pay and diseharge all of said obligations of every name, nature, and
deseription, and that i~ the event said Perry were to
transfer to defendant corporation any property or assets
in excess of the amount necessary to fully pay and discharge his subscription to capital stock in the sum of
$50,000, that the said defendant \V. R. Perry should be
given credit upon the books and records of ~efendant
corporation for the amount of such excess, not to exceed
$10,000; that in compliance with said agreement said
Perry transferred and conveyed said assets to defendant
corporation, and said defendant corporation did and performed all things to be by it done and performed under
its agreement with Perry, and that defendant corporation verily believed that there were no obligations of said

7
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Perry outstanding and unpaid when it received from
defendant Perry a conveyance of said as-sets, and that
there was therefore no requirement on its part to comply
with the provisions of Section 33-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Defendant corporation further alleged as a
part of said first separate defense that plaintiff 'vas,
prior to the consummation of said agreement between
defendant and Perry, or immediately thereafter, fully
informed of said agreement between defendant and
Perry and knew of the fact that defendant was to
receive said assets free and clear of any demand
or claims of creditors of said Perry, and of the fact
that defendant was to commence its corporate existence
without debts or obligations, save and excepting the
secured obligation in the sum of $80,000, and knew and
understood that defendant would, pursuant to the terms
of said agreement, cause shares of its capital stock to be
issued to said Perry and would permit additional shares
to the amount of $50,000 to be subscribed for and fully
paid by individuals other than said Perry upon the basis
of such understanding and agreement with defendant
Perry, and that notwithstanding such knowledge and information plaintiff failed to protest the same or to take
other action to void said assignment and conveyance, but,
on the contrary, consented thereto ; tha.t the plaintiff
agreed with said Perry that plaintiff would look to Perry
for payment of his said obligation from personal funds
of Perry and would regard said obligation as a personal
indebtedness of Perry; that defendant corporation accepted said conveyance and assignment of assets and
8
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issued to Perry 50,000 shares of the capital stock of
defendant corporation and accepted subscriptions for
and payment of its capital stock from other persons,
firms, and individuals in the sum of $50,000 in the belief
that Perry had fully paid and discharged, by payment,
compromise, or otherwise, all of the debts and obligations
of Perry; that by reason of said belief defendant corporation transacted business and incurred obligations in its
own name from the date of its incorporation to the date
of commencement of this action in the belief that the
corporate defendant was obligated for only obligations
created by itself. That by reason thereof plaintiff was
guilty of laches in attempting at this time to question the
validity of said sale and assignment by Perry to defendant corporation, and that plaintiff is estopped to question
the validity thereof at this time.
Defendant further alleged as a part of said defense
that plaintiff had accepted and received payment of the
sum of $3,588.83 from the funds of defendant ·corporation
on account of said obligation of said Perry to plaintiff
and as a credit upon said promissory note of said Perry.
It was further alleged as a part of said first separate defense that plaintiff has attached and levied upon
the moneys and funds of defendant corporation as its
funds, proceeds from the sale of a portion of said assets
so transferred and conveyed to defendant corporation by
Perry, and that plaintiff has thereby ratified and approved said sale and is estopped to deny or seek to void
said sale by Perry to defendant corporation, or to seek
to set aside said sale as frauaulent or void.
9
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It was further alleged as a part of said further defense that plaintiff wholly failed to take prompt action. to
question the validity of said sale or to void the same,
notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff knew of same and
knew of the fact that defendant corporation would issue
50,000 shares of its capital stock, fully paid, to Perry on
the basis of said sale, and knew that defendant corporation would sell and dispose of its capital stock to others
upon the belief that all of the debts and obligations of
Perry were paid and discharged, and that defendant corporation had received said assets in the belief that said
assets were free and clear from all claims and demands
of creditors of Perry, including plaintiff, and that by
reason of all of the matters and things set forth in said
first separate answer plaintiff is estopped at this time to
seek to avoid said sale and conveyance by Perry to defendant corporation, and that plaintiff is guilty of such
laches as to deny to him the right to seek the aid of
equity in said premises.
As a second further answer to plaintiff's second
cause of action defendant corporation alleged that plaintiff, by filing its first cause of action herein, and by
attaching the funds of defendant corporation, elected to
treat said conveyance and transfer of property from
Perry to defendant corporation as a. valid conveyance and
sale, and has elected his remedy herein ( R. 60-66).
To this answer of defendant corporation plaintiff
interposed a general and special demurrer to each
separate defense (R. 70-73).

10
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Under date of March 25, 1948 the trial court sustained plaintiff's general demurrer to the first separate
defense of defendant (R. 76).
Plaintiff thereupon filed his motion to strike from
the answer of defendant to the plaintiff's second cause
of action the second separate defense of defendant, upon
the ground that the second separate defense does not
state a defense to plantiff's second cause of action. That
the court has heretofore ruled that plaintiff could bring
its suit upon both causes of action, the first alleging an
assumption of liability by defendant, and the second
alleging implied assumption of liability under Chapter 2,
Title 33, U.C.A. 1943 (R. ·77).
Under date of April 14, 1948 the trial court made
and entered its order granting plaintiff's motion to strike
the second defense of defendant (R. 83).
Thereafter, on April 20, 1948, the action of the trial
court in striking the second affirmative defense to the
second cause of action was rescinded, and the court sustained plaintiff's demurrer to the second separate defense to the second cause of action without leave to
amend (R. 84).

11
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
2. That on or about the lOth day of July, 1946, the
defendant, W. R. Perry, for a valuable consideration,
made, executed and delivered to the plaintiff his certain
promissory note in words and figures as follows, to-wit:
(Note set forth)
3. That on or about July 17, 1946, a promotion
agreement was executed by W. R. Perry and Stephen
Zolezzi for and on behalf of the defendant corporation.
That the said W. R. Perry and Stephen Zolezzi suhscribed
for all of the capital stock of the defendant corporation,
excepting one thousand (1000) of the one hundred thousand (100,000) shares of capital stock subscribed. That
tlie one thousand (1000) shares that were not subscribed
for by these two incorporators were subscribed for five
hundred (500) shares for Leonard Elton and five hundred shares for L. W. Wrixon, both acting as the attorneys
for the incorporators and for the corporation. That the
other party to the said agreement was W. R. Perry. That
by the terms of the said agreement, which is set out in
Exhibit B, the promoters undertook, on behalf of the
defendant corporation, to purchase said assets from
W. R. Perry and as consideration for the said assets to
assume and pay the debts owing by W. R. Perry and including the debt owed by W. R. Perry for the note hereinabove referred to, which was then held by this plaintiff, and to give to W. R., Perry Fifty Thousand Dollars
($50,000.00) in capital stock in Perry Zolezzi, Inc., the
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corporate defendant. That by the said agreement the corporate defendant assumed and agreed to pay the said
note to the plaintiff. That on or about July 27, 1946 and
on or about August 1, 1946, the defendant corporation
receiYed property consisting of cash and real and personal property to the agreed value of One Hundred
Ninety Two Thousand Eight Hundred Nine Dollars and
Ninety Cents ($194,809.90) from W. R. Perry, and as part
of the consideration therefor promised to pay this note
to the plaintiff, and received the said property upon the
undertaking pursuant to such promise to apply the property received to the payment to this plaintiff of said note
and other debts of W. R. Perry, amounting in all to the
sum of One Hundred Forty-T,vo Thousand Eight Hundred Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($142,809.90). That
pursuant to such promise the corporate defendant, on
or about August 1, 1946, made entries upon its own books
to record the fact that it assumed this note of Eighteen
Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars and
Eighty-Three Cents ($18,588.83) owing to the plaintiff,
and that it agreed to pay the amount of this indebtedness
to the plaintiff. That the defendant corporation thereby
assumed and agreed to pay the said note to the plaintiff.
4. That pursuant to said promise the defendant
corporation, on September 21, 1946, did pay to the plaintiff the sum of .Three Thousand Five Hundred EightyEight Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents ($3,588.83), to
apply upon the said note and reduced the balance of said
note to the principal sum of Fifteen Thousand Dollars
{$15,000.00). That the payment so made was made by
13
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the defendant corporation, acting through its President
and General Manager, W. R. Perry. That during all of
the times in question, W. R. Perry was the President and
General Manager of the defendant corporation and
authorized to transact all of the business of the defendant
corporation.
5. That although the plaintiff has made demands
upon the defendants, and each of them, for the said sum
of Fifteen Thousand dollars, plus interest as provided
in the said note, neither of the defendants have paid the
said amount, and the whole thereof is past due and owing.
6. That a reasonable sum to be adjudged as attorney's fees for the attorneys for the plaintiff, in accordance with the terms of the note herein sued upon, is the
sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00).
From the foregoing Findings of Fact on the First
Cause of Action, the court now makes and enters the
following:
That the plaintiff is hereby entitled to a judgment
against the defendant corporation for Fifteen Thousand
Dollars ($15,000.00), plus interest at the rate of five per
cent per annum, as is provided in said note, from the date
of delivery to December 27, 1948, in the amount of Eighteen Hundred Eighty-One Dollars and Forty One Cents
($1,881.41), or the sum of Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One Cents {$16,881.41), plus attorney's fees in the amount of Two Thousand
Dollars ($2,000.00), together with plaintiff's costs herein
incurred.

14
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1. Adopts Findings of Fact numbers 1 and 2 a.s set
out in the first cause of action.
2. That between the 27th day of July, 1946 and
August 10, 1946, ,V. R. Perry sold, transferred and delivered all of the assets and business of the said W. R.
Perry to the defendant corporation for c.ash and credits of
One Hundred Forty~T"TO Thousand Eight Hundred
Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($142,809.90) and for the
transfer toW. R. Perry of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,
000.00) of the capital stock of the defendant corporation,
which cash, credits and capital stock were paid by the
defendant corporation, except the sum of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) due to the plaintiff from W. R.
Perry; that the defendant corporation became a purchaser of the stock of goods, wares and merchandise in
bulk from the said W. R. Perry otherwise than in the
ordinary course of trade and in the regular and usual
prosecution of the seller's business; that the defendant
corporation has pleaded in the first affirmative defense
set out in its answer that it believes that there was no
requirement on its part to comply with the provisions of
Section 33-2-2 U.C.A. 1943, known as the Bulk Sales Act,
and therefore it did not comply with the provisions of the
State statute. That the defendant corporation, the purchaser as herein stated, did not demand from the seller,
at least five days previously thereto, and receive from
the seller a statement as provided in Section 33-2-1,
U.C.A. 1943, and did not notify at least five days pre..
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viously thereto, every creditor, as shown by such verified
statement, of the proposed sale or transfer and the time
and conditions of payment, and did not cause the purchase money for such property to be applied ratably to
the payment of the bona fide claims of all creditors of
the said W. R. Perry. That by the provisions of Section
33-2-2, U. C. A. 1943, the said sale to the defendant corporation was fraudulent and void. That nevertheless,
the defendant corporation assumed control over the assets of the said W. R. Perry and sold and disposed of the
said assets without paying to the creditors of W. R.
Perry their proportionate share of the full purchase
price, except as hereinafter stated. That the plaintiff
has considered the said sale as being fraudulent and
void as to the plaintiff and has attached the property of
the defendant corporation, a part of which property were
the assets transferred by W. R. Perry to the defendant
corporation.
3. That at the time of the said sale and transfer,
W. R. Perry was indebted to the plaintiff on a promissory note in the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred
Eighty-Eight Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents ($18,588.
83), being the note set out in paragraph two of the
Findings on the First Cause of Action; that the only payment thereafter made by W. R. Perry, or by the defendant corporation to the plaintiff was the payment made by
the defendant corporation to the plaintiff of the sum of
Three Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars
and Eighty-Three Cents ($3,588.83) on September 21,
1946, to apply upon the obligations of the said note Ieav-

'
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ing a. balance o\ving from the said W. R. Perry and the
defendant corporation in the sum of Fifteen Thousand
Dollars ( $15,000.00), tog-ether "rith interest as provided
in the said note. That the said sum of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Eig-hty-Eight Dollars and Eighty-Three
Cents ($3,588.83) was not the proportionate share of the
purchase price to which this plaintiff was entitled, since
the debts of the defendant Perry, including the debt to
Plaintiff, amounted to the sum of One Hundred FortyTwo Thousand Eight Hundred Nine Dollars and Ninety
Cents ($142,809.90), and W. R. Perry transferred assets
to the defendant corporation having an agreed and reasonable value upon the date of the transfer of One Hundred Ninety-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Nine Dollars
and Ninety Cents ($192,809.90); that the defendant corporation paid in full a.ll of the other creditors of W. R.
Perry, but paid to the plaintiff only the sum of Three
Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars and
Eighty-Three Cents ($3,588.83). That the books of the
defendant corporation contain the fact that it did make
this payment of Three Thousand Five Hundred EightyEight Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents ($3,588.83) to the
plaintiff. That none of the officers or directors of the
defendant corporation objected to the making of the said
payment to the plaintiff; that the payment so made was
made by the defendant corporation acting through its
President and General Manager, W. R. Perry; that during all the times in question W. R. Perry was the President and General Manager of the defendant corporation
and authorized to transact all of the business of the
defendant corporation.
9
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4. That upon the transfer of these assets by W. R.
Perry to the defendant corporation, the defendant corporation made entries upon its books and records that
it became indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars and
EightyThree Cents ($18,588.83). That the officers and
directors of the defendant corporation made no objection
to the entries so made upon the books of the defendant
corporation, showing this indebtedness by the defendant
corporation to the plaintiff.
5. That the assets transferred to the defendant
corporation by W. R. Perry have now been sold and disposed of by the defendant corporation, and it received an
amount in excess of the debts of the defendant W. R.
Perry, which existed at the time of the transfer, and tha~
the proceeds realized therefrom are sufficient to satisfy
, the debts owing to the plaintiff.
6. That although the plaintiff has made demands
upon the defendants, and each of them, for the payment
of said sum of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00),
plus interest as provided in the said note, neither of the
said defendants have paid the· said amount, and the whole
thereof is past due and owing.
7. That a reasonable sum to be adjudged as attorney's fees to be allowed for the enforcement of the payment of this note, as is provided in said note, is the sum
of Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now
makes and enters the following:
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1. That the plaintiff is hereby a\varded judgment
against Perry Zolezzi, Inc., a corporation of the State of
Utah, for the sum of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000),
plus interest at the rate of five per cent per annum, as is
provided in the said note, from the date of delivery to
December 27, 1948, in the amount of Eighteen Hundred
Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One Cents ($1,881.41), or
the sum of Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-One
Dollars and Forty-One Cents ($16,881.41), plus attor-·
ney's fees in the amount of Two Thousand Dollars
($2,000.00), and plaintiff's eosts herein expended.
2. That the sale and transfer of the assets from
W. R. Perry to the defendant Perry Zolezzi, Inc., a corporation, be held fraudulent and void as to this plaintiff.
3. That the value of the assets transferred by W. R.
Perry to the defendant corporation being in excess of the
amount of the debts owing by W. R. Perry and the value
of the assets being more than sufficient to pay each of
the creditors of W. R. Perry the full amount of their
claims against W. R. Perry, including the claim of this
plaintiff, with interest and attorney's fees added, the
defendant corporation shall pay the amount of this judg.:.
ment to the plaintiff.
4. That the judgment herein rendered on the First
and Second Causes of Action are not cumulative, but the
satisfaction of one judgment will satisfy and discharge
the other.

19
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JUDGMENT
On plaintiff's First Cause of Action plaintiff is
hereby awarded judgment against the defendant corporation for Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00), plus
interest thereon at the rate of five per cent per annum
from date of delivery to December 27, 1948, iri the amount
of Eighteen Hundred Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One
Cents ($1,881.41), amounting to Sixteen Thousand Eight
Hundred Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One cents ($16,~
881.41), together with attorney's fees in the amount of
Two Thousand Dollars ($2000.00), and plaintiff is also
awarded his costs expended herein.
On plaintiff's Second Cause of Action plaintiff is
hereby awarded judgment against the defendant corporation for Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00), together
with interest at the rate of five per cent per annum from ' ' , ,
date of delivery to December 27, 1948, amounting to
Eighteen Hundred Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One
Cents ($1881.41), making Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One Cents ($16,881.41), together with attorneys fees in the amount of Two
Thousand Dollars ($2000.00), and plaintiff shall also
have his costs herein expended.
That the sale and transfer of the assets from W. R.
Perry to the defendant corporation is hereby declared to
be fraudulent and void as to the plaintiff.
That the value of the assets transferred by W. R.
Perry to the defendant corporation, being in excess of
20
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the amount of the debts owing by W. R. Perry and the
value of the assets being more than sufficient to pay
each of the creditors of W. R. Perry the full amount of
their claims against ,V. R. Perry, including the claim of
this plaintiff, 'vith interest and attorney's fees added,
the defendant corporation is hereby required to pay the
amount of said judgment to the plaintiff herein.
That the judgment rendered herein on Plaintiff's
First and Second Causes of action are not cumulative,
and the satisfaction of one judgment will satisfy and discharge the other. (R. 96-103, 105-106).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant corporation was organized in July, 1946.
Its capital of $100,000 was paid in by $50,000 cash paid
in by Stephen Zolezzi and $50,000 cash and property paid
in by W. R. Perry who had been a member of a partnership known as Neilson and Perry, then owned by Perry,
which owed debts and obligations in the sum of $164,000,
of which $36,500 was a mortgage on certain real property
which had an agreed value of $135,000. The remaining
obligations were unsecured, among which was a note of
plaintiff in the sum of $23,588.83. A fund of $168,000 to
pay all liabilities of Neilson & Perry and Perry was provided as follows:
$80,000 by a new mortgage on the real estate
$50,000 cash to Perry to be loaned by the corporation
$10,000 cash from Perry
21
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$18,000 turkey drafts owned by Perry
$10,000 accounts receivable owned by Perry and to
be converted into cash
Perry was to pay his $50,000 subscription to the
capital stock of defendant corporation by paying in the
$4,000 residue of the above fund after payment of all
debts and obligations and by transferring to the corporation the equity in the real estate, $55,000, plus $30,000
(the agreed value of certain supplies and prepayments
in the sum of $15,000, together with additional accounts
receivable and assets in the sum of $15,000), making a
total of $89,000, from which was to be deducted $40,000
of the $50,000 loaned by the corporation to Perry. The
remaining $10,000 of the $50,000 loaned by the corporation to Perry for his use in paying all debts of Neilson &
Perry and Perry was to be repaid by Perry to the corporation and was to be a corporate asset, thus paying
Perry's subscription in full.
I

Perry was to be President and General Manager of
the defendant corporation and was to engage in the
business of buying, processing and selling turkeys.
The fund for payment of all liabilities of Neilson &
Perry and Perry was to be deposited in First National
Bank to be disbursed upon written direction of Perry,
but only after receipt of a certificate of title insurance
showing title to the land, buildings and equipment free
of liens and incumbrances in the defendant corporation,
subject only to the new mortgage in the sum of $80,000
and current taxes.
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This proposed transaction was represented by a preorganization agreement between Perry and Zolezzi (Exhibit "B").
One of the provisions of that agreement was as follows:
''(It is understood that the liability due Sher
Khan, in the amount of $23,588.83, may be settled
temporarily by the payment of, say, $5,000.00 in
cash and the execution by Mr. Perry of a note
for the balance or $18,588.83. In such event, the
cash remaining in the hands of the First National
Bank of Salt Lake City, to be transferred by Mr.
Perry to the new corporation will be increased by
$18,588.83 and will be subject to the obligation incurred by Mr. Perry in the same amount of
$18,588.83.) ''
This preorganization agreement was dated July 17,
1946. Prior thereto Perry had paid $5,000 on plaintiff's
obligation and had executed the note in question in this
case, signed by himself, dated June 1, 1946, but not delivered to plaintiff until July 11, 1946 (R. 131).
The articles of incorporation of defendant corporation were dated July 16, 1946 and filed July 22, 1946.
On July 27, 1946 Perry conveyed the real property to
defendant corporation, and on the same date a mortgage
on the property was executed by defendant corporation
for $80,000 to the bank, and the sum was deposited to the
credit of the corporation on August 6, 1946. (R. 201)
On July 27, 1946 Perry also transferred other assets,
stock in trade, merchandise, fixtures, furniture and a.c-

23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

counts receivable to the corporation pursuant to the
provisions of Exhibit '' B' '.
Moneys were withdrawn for the payment of creditors
of Neilson & Perry and Perry through Mr. Wilson of the
Bank and a Mr. Duke, an employee of Neilson & Perry
and Perry; later secretary of defendant corporation (R.
138, 201).
The corporation held a meeting of the Board of
Directors at San Francisco, California, on July 29, 1946,
at which the corporation accepted the conveyances from
Perry of the real and personal property for the sum of
$89,000, giving him credit for $40,000 on his $50,000 note
and issuing him 49,000 shares of stock. It was also provided in the minutes (Exhibit I) that in the event the
fair value of the assets ultimately contributed by Perry
should be less than the value specified ($4000 cash and
$30,000 miscellaneous assets) that t~e $40,000 credit on
the note should be reduced, or in the event it was more
that the credit on the note should be increased.
The corporation, however, did not commence doing
business until September 3, 1946 (R. 135). In the meantime Perry did business in the name of W. R. Perry,
Turkeys, using the corporate facilities and property.
The company books were opened on September 3,
194~, and the opening entries were made hy Mr. Duke
and Wells, Baxter & Miller, Mr. Perry's accountants, as
directed by Mr. Perry ( R. 159, 160). In setting up the
corporate books they listed as an account payable by the
24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

corporation the .oblig·ation to plaintiff in the sum of
$18,388.83 and g·aye Perry credit for $21,564.11 for
"receipt of assets and assumption of liabilities of W. R.
Perry.''
On February 21, 194"/ Perry paid $3588.83 to plaintiff by company check and the same was entered on the
corporate books.
In :Jiarch 1947, Perry ceased to be President, Manager and stockholder of the defendant corporation and
severed his connection with the company.
Plaintiff seeks to hold the corporation liable upon
the promissory note upon three theories :
1. That on or about July 1, 1946, it for valuable
consideration, promised to pay the note and assumed and
agreed to pay the same.
2. That on the same date it received from Perry
certain property in the amount of the note upon an
undertaking to apply the same, pursuant to such promise,
to pay it to plaintiff.
(This was the first cause of action.)
3. That in the sale from Perry to defendant corporation in July 1946, there was no compliance with the
Bulk Sales Law and that the corporation has disposed :of
the property received from Perry and hence the sale was
fraudulent and void as to plaintiff and therefore the
corporation is liable on the note to plaintiff.
25
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(This was the second cause of action pleaded by
plaintiff by way of amendment to his complaint.)
Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff on both
causes of action.
Such additional facts as may be pertinent will be discussed and referred to in connection with the respective
assignments of error.

SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR
1. The trial court erred in overruling defendant's
general and special demurrer to plaintiff's complaint as
amended (R. 55, 56, 59), and in denying defendant's
motion to strike the second cause of action (R. 57, 59),
and in denying defendant's motions to require plaintiff to elect between the two repugnant and self destructive causes of action (R. 57, 59, 90, 127, 128, 178, 179).
2. The trial court erred in sustaining, without leave
to amend, plantiff's demurrer to defendant's second
affirmative defense alleging an election of remedies by
Plaintiff which barred plaintiff's second cause of action
(R. 65-66, 70-73, 84).
3. The trial court erred in sustaining plaintiff's
general demurrer to defendant's first affirmative defense to the second cause of action (R. 62-65, 70-73, 76, 84).
4. The trial court erred in admitting immaterial
and incompetent evidence with reference to plaintiff's
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first cause of action (R. 49, 128; 91, 129); and in failing
to grant defendant's motion to strike the same (R. 198,
199) ; and in finding the following facts as to the first
cause of action: That by the terms of a certain promotion
agreement, Exhibit "B '', the promoters undertook on
behalf of defendant to hav-e defendant assume and pay
the note of plaintiff; that by the terms and prov:isions of
said Exhibit "B" defendant assumed and agreed to pay
the note of plaintiff (R. 97, 98); that on or about July 27,
1946 and August 1, 1946, defendant, as part of the consideration for receipt of certain property from W. R.
Perry, promised to pay the note of plaintiff and received
said property upon an undertaking- to apply the property
to the payment of said note (R. 98); tl1at pursuant to said
promise defendant made entries upon its own books
and records of the fact that it assumed the note and
that it agreed to pay the debt to plaintiff, and that defendant thereby assumed and agreed to pay plaintiff
(R. 98); that pursuant to said promise defendant on
September 21, 1946 did pay plaintiff $3,588.83 on the note
(R. 98); that Perry as president and general manager of
defendant ".,.as authorized to transact all business of defendant, including the making of said payment (R. 98,
102); and in concluding as a matter of law that plaintiff was entitled to judgment on the first cause of action
(R. 99); and in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff
and against defendant thereon (R. 105-106)).
5. The trial court erred in finding as a fact that
there was no compliance by defendant with the Bulk
Sales Law in the particulars enumerated (R. 100, 101)
27
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and that the sale by Perry to defendant was fraudulent
and void. (R. 100, 101) a.nd that plaintiff considered the
same fraudulent and void (R. 100, 101), and that plaintiff
did not receive his proportionate share of the property
subject to .the Bulk Sales Law which was conveyed by
Perry to defendant (R. 100, 101); and in concluding as a
matter of law that the sale was fraudulent, void and invalid as to all property conveyed (R. 103); and in making
and entering its judgment and decree on the second cause
of action that said sale of all of said property was fraudulent, void and invalid as to plaintiff, and that defendant
was liable to plaintiff for the amount of the note (R. 105,
106).
6. The trial court erred in making and entering
inconsistent, repugnant and self-destructive findings of
fact, conclusions of law and judgments on the two
separate counts (R. 97-106).

ARGUJ\tlENT
POINT I
THE TRIAI.J COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
DEFENDANT'S GENERAL AND SPECIAL DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AS
AMENDED AND IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTIONS TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO ELECT
BETWEEN TWO REPUGNANT AND SELFDESTRUCTIVE CAUSES OF ACTION.
Plaintiff's original complaint was drawn upon an
alleged cause of action involving two theories, viz., that
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defendant corporation had assumed and agreed to pay
the note of Perry to plaintiff and that as a part of said
transaction Perry had delivered to defendant corporation
certain property which defendant corporation undertook
to apply to the payment of said note.
These allegations of the complaint were denied and
defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds.
Thereafter, by ex parte leave of court, plaintiff
filed an amendment to his complaint, adding a second
cause of action, alleging that the sale of assets by Perry
to defendant corporation "\\ras void and fraudulent because of failure to comply with the Bulk Sales Law.
Defendant promptly moved to strike this amend-.
ment or to require plaintiff to elect as to which cause
he would stand on for recovery. This motion was denied
by the trial court. ( R. 70-73, 59)
It is axiomatic that plaintiff may not by amendment plead an additional or different cause of action,
and this court has clearly stated the proposition in Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, et al, 71 Utah 535, 267
Pac. 1020 as follows :

'' * * * It, of course, is familiar doctrine that
where allegations of a declaration are repugnant to and inconsistent with each other, they
thereby neutralize each other and render the
declaration bad on general demurrerl; that a
cause of action alleged in an amended petition,
though founded in the same grievance or injury
as that described in the original, is a. different
29
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cause of action if it is dependent upon different
grounds for h~lding the defendant responsible
for the wrong alleged; and that the power of a
court to permit an amendment of a pleading does
not authorize an importation which in effect introduces a new or different cause of action. Hancock
v. Luke, 46 Utah 26,148 P. 452; Johnson v. AmericanS. & R. Co., 80 Neb. 255, 116 N. W. 517; Kirton
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 57 Fla. 79, 87, 49 So.
1024; Herlihy v. Little, 200 Mass. 284, 86 N. E.
294; Altpeter v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 26 Cal.
App. 705,148 P. 241; Blair v. Brailey (C.C.A.)
221 F. 7."
Plaintiff contended that the second cause of action
was but a second count upon the same cause of action,
and upon this theory the ruling and subsequent rulings
of the trial court with reference to the same subject were
based. Therein the court was in error.
Not only is the second cause of action an additional
and different cause of action, but it is in fact repugnant
to, destructive of, and incompatible with the first, just
as the first is repugnant to and destructive of the second.
The two could not stand together under oath as the sworn
claim of plaintiff as his cause of action.
We are entirely familiar with the rule which permits
a plaintiff to set forth his cause of action in several
counts, upon any one of which he may or may not recover.
They may be based upon different theories and need not
be entirely consistent but they cannot be repugnant or
self-destructive. A plaintiff may not in one allegation
s.tate that there was a contract between the parties and
in the next allegation, whether in the same or a separate
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pleading, allege that there was no contract. He may ·not
allege validity of a transaction for one purpose and
allege invalidity of the same transaction for a different
purpose. They are repugnant and self-destructive and,
as this court has said, it is the same as no allegation at all.
How could the conveyance of assets by Perry to the
Corporation be a valid consideration for the assumption
of a debt of a third person as alleged in the first cause
of action if such conveyance was void and of no effect as
alleged in the second cause of action, and vice versa~
This proposition was raised by defendant by special
demurrer, by motion to strike, by motion_ to require plaintiff to elect at the commencement of the trial, by similar
motion at the conclusion of the evidence, and by motion
for new trial.
The trial court persisted in the error, even to the
extent of making inconsistent and repugnant findings of
fact and of entering a separate judgment on each of these
self-destructive causes of action, as will be hereafter
presented in this argument.
The court should have granted the motion to strike
the second cause of action or sustained the demurrer or
required plaintiff to elect.
That these two causes of action are repugnant and
self-destructive is self-evident. One cause is based on an
express contract, alleged to be valid, for assumption
of a debt by a third person in consideration of a convey-
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ance of property to the third person. The second cause
of action alleges that the same contract alleged in the
first cause of action was fraudulent, null and void.
This error may be raised by special demurrer where
it appears on the face of the pleadings and by motions
requiring an election on the part of the pleader. Defendant pursued both remedies.
1 American Juris. 469 :
''Sec. 83. Consistency of Several Causes of
Action.
''By necessary implication, causes of action
which may be joined must have the element of
consistency to the extent that a choice of one does
not create a waiver of the opportunity to turn to
the other. Causes of action which are in their
nature incongruous or inconsistent cannot be
united in the same p.etition, even though they
arise out of the same transaction or out of transactions connected with the same subject of action.
Causes of action are inconsistent with each other
when they cannot stand together; when, if one is
true, the other cannot be; or when one defeats the
other. Thus, causes of action for breach of contract to convey property and for breach of warranty of authority to sell cannot be joined. Nor
can one, in the same action, treat a contract as
rescinded and at the same time rely upon the contract as existing.''
41 American Juris. 534 :
''Sec. 537. Generally-While, ordinarily, the
proper method of raising a question of misjoinder of causes of action, when that objection
;J2
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is apparent upon the face of the pleading, is by a
demurrer specially assigning the misjoinder as a
ground of objection, in a number of jurisdictions
objections to the improper blending of several
c.a.uses of action, or the misjoinder of causes of
action, may be raised by a motion to compel the
plaintiff to elect upon which cause of action he
will proceed. And where the plaintiff pleads two
inconsistent causes of action, he will be compelled'
to elect. But where a. complaint contains
two or more counts, and each sets forth a
separate and distinct cause of action, the plaintiff
will not be required to elect on which count he
will proceed, provided there is no misjoinder of causes of action; neither will election be enforced
where, otherwise, the causes are not improperly
blended. Thus, where, under the practice in a
particular jurisdiction, the plaintiff may declare
and recover upon any one or more of several
causes of action on contract which are not inconsistent with each other, he will not be required to
elect as to which contract he will rely on.''
The doctrine announced in the Bastian case has consistently been reaffirmed by this court.
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103
Utah 414, 135 Pac. (2d) 919, this court said:

"*

* * It is well established, as defendant
contends, that the power of the court to permit
an amendment to the pleadings does not extend so
far as to permit the importation of an entirely new
and different cause of action. Grover v. Cash, 69
Utah 194, 253 Pac. 676; Combined Metals, Inc.,
v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535, 267 Pac. 1020; Peterson
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 79 Utah 213, 8 Pac. (2d)
627; Newton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 88 Utah
547, 40 Pae. (2d) 204."
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This should be specially true where the new cause
of action is repugnant to and destructive of the first
cause of action.
The most recently followed is Powell v. Powell, -------Utah ________ , 188 Pac. (2d) 736, wherein this court said the
following:
"It being impossible to reconcile the repugnant and inconsistent allegations of the complaint
and to determine whether the cause of action
vested in the administrator or the beneficiaries,
the general demurrer was properly sustained. It
is unnecessary to treat the questions raised by the
special demurrer, as was stated by this court in
the case of Combined Metals, Inc., et al v. Bastian
et al., 71 ·Utah 535, 554, '267 Pac. 1020, 1026: '* * *
It, of course, is familiar doctrine that where
allegations of a declaration are repugnant to and
inconsistent with each other, they thereby neutralize each other and render th-e declaration bad
on general demurrer; * * *.' ''
See also Walser v. Moran, 42 Nevada 111, 173 P.
1149.
See also Lynn v. Knob Hill Improvement Co., 177
Cal. 56, 169 P. 1009.
On the matter of requiring an election between counts
which are repugnant and destructive, see Sections 653
and 654, 1 Bancroft Code Pleading 942, 943. Where the
c.auses of action are improperly united an election should
be required. Warfield v. ICrueger, 96 Cal. ·App. 671, 274 Pac. 764.
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Peppers v. Metzler, 71 Colo. 234, 205 Pac. 945.

Whitson
215 Pac. 846.

Y.

Pac. Nash Motor Co., 37 Idaho 204,

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING,
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, PLAINTIFF'S
DE~fURRER TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ALLEGING .AN ELECTION
OF REMEDIES BY PLAJ.NTIFF WHICH .BARRED
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.
To plaintiff's second cause .of action defendant corporation pleaded as a second affirmative defense that
by filing his first cause of action and by attaching funds
of defendant corporation on the basis ·of a valid contract
plaintiff had elected to treat. the sale ·by Perry to the
corporation as valid, and that he had elected his remedy
in the case; hence the second cause of action could not
stand.
This point was first raised upon defendant's motion
to strike the second cause of action, which was denied,
and again ·upon the demurrer of plaintiff to defendant's
second affirmative defen.se, which was sustained without
leave to amend (R. 84). · Therein the trial court erred .
. . By.the f~r~t cause of a~tion plaintiff_alleged a valid
contra~t,. for consideration, by which it was claimed defendant corporation had assumed and agreed to pay the
35
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note of Perry held by plaintiff. By that action plaintiff
elected his remedy and could not thereafter contend that
the same sale was void and the consideration for the
agreement non-existent. Such election having been made,
plaintiff had to stand thereon. He not only took decisive
action by commencing the action on the theorY of validity
of the contract, but also attached funds of defendant.
Cook v. Covey Ballard Motor Company, 69 Utah 161,
253 Pac. 196 :
"It is well settled that one who is induced to
make a sale or trade by the deceit of a vendee has
the choice of two remedies upon his discovery of
the fraud ; he may affirm the contract and sue for
his damages, or he may rescind it and sue for the
property he has sold or what he has paid out on
the contract. The former remedy counts upon the
affirmance or validity of the transaction, the
latter repudiates the transaction and counts upon
it~ invalidity. The two remedies are inconsistent,
and the ·choice of one rejects the other, because
the sale clllflhtot be valid OJnd void at the sa;me time.
Stuart v. Hayden (C.C.A.) 72 F. 402, 5 Page
Contracts, Sec. 3023. ''
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commisssion, 81 Utah
213, 17 Pac. (2d) 239:

'' • * * The law applicable to the election of
remedies is thus stated in 9 R. C. L., p. 960: 'An
election of a remedy which has the effect of an
estoppel in pais or an estoppel by record, in that
class of cases in which the remedies are really inconsistent, is generally considered made when an
action has been commenced on one of such
remedies. Some courts go so far as to say that in
such cases the choice of a remedy once made can-
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not be withdrawn or reconsidered though no advantage lias been gained nor injury done by the
choice, and no injury would be done by setting the
choice aside. But the more reasonable rule is that
the mere bringing of an action which has been dismissed before judgment, and in which no element
. of estoppel is pais has arisen, that is, where no
advantage has been gained or no detriment has
been occasioned, is not an election.'
''To the same effect is the statement of law
in 20 C. J. 29-32, and cases cited in the footnotes.
While there is some conflict in the adjudicated
cases as to the effect of the mere commencement
of an action, the authorities are quite generally
agreed that it is the first decisive act of election
that is binding and that subsequent acts may not
be said to constitute an election. Thus it is said
in 20 C. J. · 34, 35: 'The doctrine of election of
remedies applies to the first decisive act of election, and makes it a defense to the prosecution of
a second inconsistent suit or remedy.' ''
Robison v. Robison, 57 Utah 215, 203 Pac. 340.
Howard v. Paulson, 41 Utah 490, 127 Pac. 284:
"The great weight of authority is to the effect that, where the duty to elect applies, then the
bringing of an action based upon one of the
remedies or rights constitutes an election which
is irrevocable except in case of mistake of fact
or some other good and sufficicent legal excuse. ·
Peppers v. Metzler, 71 Colo. 234, 205 Pac. 945:
'' 'A remedy based on the theory of the affirmance of a contract or other transaction is inconsistent with a remedy arising out of the same
facts and based on the theory of its disaffirmance
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or rescission, so that the election of either is an
abandonment of the other.' ''
As applied to fraudulent conveyances, 37 C. J. S.
1136, section 305 states :
''A creditor cannot obtain relief on the theory
that his debtor's conveyance was void and of no
effect and on the theory that the debtor effectively conveyed the property.''
The same rule applies with reference to fraudulent
sales under the Bulk Sales Act. 37 C. J. S. 1328, sec. 478.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING PLAINTIFF'S GENERAL DEMURRER TO DEFENDANT'S
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, ALLEGING
W A IV E R , ESTOPPEL AND . ELECTION OF
REMEDY.
This right. under the Bulk Sales statute is a personal one which may be waived by the creditor or may be lost
by electing some other remedy. If the creditor, for example, chooses to waive his rights and treat the sale as valid
and elects a remedy on the basis of a valid sale, the
creditor loses his right under the statute and must stand
or fall as to his rights in the light of his election. H:e
cannot do both. He may also permit an estoppel to arise.
37 C. J. S., 1328, Sec. 478, under Fraudulent Conveyances.
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Bulk sales la'v is for the benefit of creditors and they
may or may not elect to claim the benefit of it.
Castleman v. Stryker, 109 Ore. 326, 219 Pac. 1081.
Creditors may W'"aive their rights or estop themselves from asserting invalidity.
Kinney

Y.

Coleman

Yoelin Bros., 76 Colo. 136, 230 Pac. 127.

Y.

Costello, 115 Kan. 463, 223 Pac. 289.

Whitehouse v. Nelson, 43 Wash. 174, 86 Pac. 174.
Chelsea Sales Corp. v. Jacobs, 193 So. 402.
Wolfe v. Bellfuir Hat Co., 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 908.
Torreyson v. Burnbaugh, 105 Mo. App. 435, 79
1002.

S.W.

A creditor who consents to or acquiesces In sale
waives his rights and is estopped, particularly if he
asserts rights under the sale and attempts to obtain the
proceeds.
Palo Sav. Bk. v. Cameron, 184 Iowa 183, 168 N.W.
769.
Marshall v. Leon, 267 Ill. App. 242.
Schramm and Schmieg v. Shope, 200 Ia. 760, 205
N.W. 350.
Kinney v. Y oelin Bros., Supra.
39
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In last named case creditor attached proceeds in
hands of buyer. This affirmed the sale.
Acceptance of a note may be a waiver.
Starr Piano v. Sherer, 97 Ind. App. 77, 185 N.E. 665.
Schramm-Schmieg v. Shope, Supra.
Creditor·with knowledge of sale must act promptly
or within a reasonable time or lose its rights.
Lietchfield v. Heinicke, 200 Ia. 958, 205 N.W. 774.
See also Andrew v. Rivers, 207 Ia. 343, 223 N. ,V. 102.
Under defendant's first affirmative defense to the
second cause of action defendant could have established
that this election, waiver and estoppel were accomplished
at the time of the original transaction. The trial court
erred in eliminating a consideration of these defenses to
the second cause of action by sustaining plaintiff's demurrer thereto. (R. 76).
On this entire proposition, from beginning to end, the
trial court erred in its rulings with reference to this Bulk
Sales Law and therein· it deprived defendant of its right ·
to have the real merits of the case heard and tried. Apparently the trial court felt that a sale of property, subject to the Bulk Sales Law, created a liability on the part
of the purchaser regardless of anything that the creditor
might do or not do.
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Plaintiff and the court were under the impression
that the Bulk Sales Law is different from other remedies;
that it cannot be waived; that such a sale cannot be ratified or approved by creditors affected by it; that a
creditor whose rig~hts are affected, with full knowledg·e
of the facts and that others 'viii act to their prejudice in
reliance thereon owes no duty to speak up if he does not
approve the same; and that in spite of such acceptance
and waiver he may at any time later, after others have
acted, and notwithstanding his own conduct, step in and
repudiate the transaction. We respectfully submit that
such is not the law.
Then and there it was the duty of plaintiff to act
and have his status determined.
If the corporation was to assume and pay his note
there was a proper way to have that accomplished by an
instrument in writing in compliance with the Statute of
Frauds.
If the corporation was not to assume and pay his
note he had the right to take appropriate action for the
protection of his interest by then and their impounding
the assets.
On the other hand he could, with full knowledge
thereof, accept the transaction as it was and look only to
the signer of the note for payment and leave his status
unimpaired as a personal creditor of Perry.
He could also elect to treat the sale as valid and
take his chances as to whether he could prove a legal
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liability on the part of defenda~t under the first cause
of action.
All of these proper defenses were comprehended
within its first affirmative defense and it should have
been permitted to present its evidence with reference
thereto.
Defendant's first affirmative defense came squarely
within the rule announced by the Supreme Court of
Oregon in Rice v. West, 80 Ore. 640, 157 Pac. 1105, which
case arose under the Bulk Sales Law. The law was not
complied with, but the creditor knew of the transaction
and consented thereto and agreed to look to the seller
rather than enforce his rights under the statute. The
Supreme Court said as follows:

· , '' * * * The purchaser did, however, obtain a
statement which contained all the information
required by the statute, although the oath was
lacking. Even where the statute is strictly complied with a creditor loses his right to void the
sale if he makes no move to protect his claim. Rice
was notified, and then in effect consented to the
sale by saying that he would look wholly to the
Wests for the payment of his account. Every
benefit which the statute has designed for the
creditor was made available to Rice, and yet he
not only in effect gave his approval to the sale,.
but he waited for two years before making any
move to repudiate such approval and void the
sale, and he has therefore waived his right to
claim the benefit of the statute. The transaction
between Hume and the Wests 'vas characterized
by honesty and fair dealing; nothing was concealed from Rice, but on the other hand he was inform42
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ed of the truth; there 'Yas no attempt to deceive or
defraud; and although the statute was not technically observed nevertheless Rice was informed of
all that he would haYe kno"\\rn, even though the
statute had been literally followed. If the· bulk
sales statute had been strictly complied with,
nevertheless, his own conduct would have precluded him from now calling upon that statute
for aid and by the same token he ought not to be
heard to say that a failure to take a formal step in
a technical way will relieve him from what would
otherwise be a complete "Taiver on his part.''

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
IMMATERI.A_L AND INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE
WITH REFERENCE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION; AND IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE SAME;
AND IN FINDING THE FOLLOWING FACTS AS
TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: THAT BY
THE TERMS OF A CERTAIN PROMOTION AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT "B", THE PROMOTERS UNDERTOOK ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT TO HAVE
DEFENDANT ASSUME AND PAY THE NOTE OF
PLAINTIFF; THAT BY THE TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF SAID EXHIBIT ''B'' DEFENDANT ASSUMED AND AGREED TO PAY THE NOTE OF
PLAINTIFF; THAT ON OR ABOUT JULY 27, 1946
AND AUGUST 1, 1946 DEFENDANT, AS PART OF
THE CONSIDERATION FOR RECEIPT OF CERTAIN PROPERTY FROM W. R. PERRY, PROMISED
TO PAY _THE NOTE OF PLAINTIFF AND RECEIVSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ED SAID PROPERTY UPON AN UNDERTAKING
TO APPLY THE PROPERTY TO THE PAYMENT
. OF SAID NOTE; THAT P.URBUANT' TO SAID
PROMISE DEFENDANT 1\IADE ENTRIES UPON
ITS OWN BOOKS TO RECORD THE FACT
THAT IT ASSUMED THE NOTE AND THAT IT
AGREED TO PAY THE Al\IOUNT OF SAID INDEBTEDNESS TO PLAINTIFF AND THAT DEFENDANT THEREBY ASSUMED AND AGREED
TO PAY THE NOTE TO PLAINTIFF; THAT PURSUANT T'O SAID PROMISE DEFENDANT ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1946 DID PAY TO PLAINTIFF $3,588.83
ON THE NOTE; THAT PERRY, AS PRESIDENT
AND GENERAL MANAGER OF DEFENDANT WAS
AUTHORIZED TO TRANSACT ALL OF THE BUSINESS OF DEFENDANT,· INCL1JDING THE MAICING OF SAID PAYMENT; AND IN CONCLUDING
AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE FIRST CAUSE
OF ACTION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT FOR HE UNPAID AMOUNT OF
THE NOTE, PLUS INTEREST AND ATTORNEYS
FEES; AND IN ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT ON
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.
On the first cause of action the trial court found
that on or about July 17, 1946 by preorganization agreement the promoters of defendant corporation obligated
it to assume and pay this note, and that on or about July
27, 1946 and August 1, 1946 defendant corporation, as
a part of the consideration for the receipt of eertain
44
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property from Perry, promised to pay the note in question and received said property upon an undertaking
to apply the same to payment of the note. It further found
that pursuant to such promise it made entries upon its
own books of the fact that it assumed the note and that
it thereby assumed and agreed to pay the note.
Defendant assails these findings of fact upon the
following grounds :
1. Insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the same.
2. Errors of the court in admitting immaterial and
incompetent eviaence with reference thereto.
3. That the evidence, if admissable, was insufficient to meet the Statute of Frauds.
4. That the findings, if sufficient and supported by
competent evidence, are destroyed and rendered nugatory by the findings, conclusions and judgment on the
second cause of action; hence could not sustain such a
promise, if made.
Let us, therefore, first examine the evidence and see
whether it was sufficient and whether it was properly
admitted for consideration by the court.
The statutes involved are as follows :
33-5-4 U.C.A. 1943:
''In the following cases every agreement shall
be void unless such agreement, or some note or
45
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memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith.
• * * ... •
''2. Every promise to answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another.

•

* * •

"'"

83-5-6 U. C.A. 1943 :

''A promise to answer for the obligation of
another in any of the following cases is deemed an
original obligation of the promisor and need not
be in writing :
'' 1. Where the promise is made by one who
has received property of another upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise, or by
one who has received a discharge from an obligation in whole or in part in consideration of such
promise.''
The court found that the transaction complied with
both statutes.
Defendant contends that it satisfies neither.
It will be observed tha.t the basis of both statutes is
a valid promise or undertaking on the part of the third
party to pay the debt. of another. In one case it must
be in writing; in the o.ther it may rest in parole; but in
both cases it must be a.. certain, definite and enforceable
contract for valid consideration.
No party to this transaction testified to any such
understanding or as to any such promise. Perry appeared and testified for plaintiff but he was silent on this
46
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subject. The eYidenre of the promise, if such there was,
must be gleaned by innuendo or deduction from the following:

THE PREORG.A.NIZATION AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT "B").
This agreement bet,y·een Perry and Stephen Zolezzi
(the principal stockholders of defendant) makes reference to the note of plaintiff and provides as follows :
\

''(It is understood that the liability due Sher
Khan in the amount of $23,588.83, may be settled
temporarily by the payment of, say, $5,000.00 in
cash and the execution by Mr. Perry of a note for
the balance or $18,588.83. In such event, the cash
remaining in the hands of the First National Bank
of Salt Lake City, to be transferred by Mr. Perry
to the ne\v corporation will be increased by $18,588.83 and will be subject to the obligation incurred by 1\fr. Perry in the same amount of
$18,588.83.) ' '
Defendant contends that this agreement was not
binding on the corporation, should not have been admitted
in evidence over its objection, did not satisfy either
statute, and in any event did not contain a promise to
have the corporation assume and pay the note. The corporation never at any time adopted this agreement of
the promoters, never received the conveyances pursuant
thereto, and by its first meeting completely omitted any
reference to the Sher Khan obligation. (See Ex. I)
Agreements of promoters are not binding on the corporation unless adopted by them expressly or impliedly
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by receiving property in consideration thereof. This
corporation did neither. It accepted conveyance on the
basis of its own independent action after it was organized.
Tanner v. Sinaloa Land & Fruit Co., 43 Utah 14,
134 Pac. 586.
Murry v. Monter, 90 Utah 105, 60 Pac. (2d) 960.
The case does not come within the doctrine announced in Wall v. Mining & Smelting Co., 20 Utah 474, 59 Pac.
399, because it never adopted the agreement but instead
set up its O"\\"'Il status and expressly provided how its
opening entries should be made. According to its action
the Sher Khan note was to be paid by Perry from the
funds provided for him for such purpose. This case
comes squarely within the doctrine announced in the
Murry case. Nor did the preorganization agreement, assuming, without admitting, that it was admissible, provide that defendant corporation should assume the lia.bitlity. It provided that if Perry gave the corporation
money equal to the amount of the Sher Khan debt that the
corporation should take the funds ''subject to'' the claim
of Sher Kahn.
The most that can be said for such a provision would
be that Perry might use company funds to pay the debt.
This is vastly different from saying that the note becomes a company liability.
Courts have uniformly held that taking property
"subject to" a debt, does not create an independent
liability on the part of the grantee.
48
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Of course, ""'hat actually oecurred was that Perry
transacted business on his own account between July 22,
1946 and September 3, 1946, made paper profits, revalued
the assets, had the books set up on the basis of the status
on September 3, 1946, and his auditors and bookkeepers
make the entries he directed, including an entry in favor
of Sher Khan as a creditor, and then called it square. Mr.
Duke, Perry's former employee and later secretary of
the Company, testified that no such additional money
was received by the company. It was a paper transaction.
It did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. It was
never signed by the c.orporation or adopted by it.
New Jersey Mfrs. Casuality Ins. Co. v. Bersick, 119
N.J. Law, (N.J.), 194 A. 438.
"Where release, whereby corporation was to
indemnify individual against certain suits, was
not signed by corporation or by its duly authorized agent for that purpose, it was unenforceable as
against corporation under statute of frauds (2
Comp. st. 1910, p. 2612, sec. 5).''
Taylor v. R. D. Scott & Co., 149 Mich. 525, 113 N.W.

32.
"Where plaintiff made a written proposition
to defendant corporation and the trustees of an
estate to which a majority of the corporate stock
belonged, to purchase defendant's manufacturing
plant and some material, and the proposition
was indorsed ''accepted,'' followed by the signatures of the four trustees as such, who were also
four of the five directors of the corporation,
there was not such a contract in writing binding
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on the defendant corporation as to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds.''
Asbury v. Hugh L. Bates Lodge No. 686, F. & A.M.,
62 Ohio App. 430, 24 N.E. 2d 638:
"Written minutes in lodges books, signed by
secretary, or resolution to accept offer to sell
realty to the· lodge, do not satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. Gen. Code, sec.
8621.''
McCaffrey v. Town of Lake, 234 Wis. 251, 290 N.W.
283.
''A record of the minutes of a town board
meeting, signed by a town clerk and showing the
passage of a motion that town attorney be retained 'for the ensuing term,' was not a 'memorandum' of contract· employing such attorney nor
'signed by the party to be charged' so as to satisfy
the statute of frauds. St. 1937, sec. 241.02.''
BOOK ENTRIES:
When Perry finally ceased his individual operations
under the name of V-.7. R. Perry, Turkeys, under which he
was paying his liabilities and at the same time transacting business for his own account, he had his auditors
and bookkeeper make opening entries for the new corporation, defendant. Instead of doing so in accordance
with the directions and actions of the board of directors
at its meeting on July 27, 1946 (Exhibit I) he had them
give himself credit for additional assets (paper profits)
accrued in the meantime and had them set up the Sher
Khan obligation as a company liability (R. 159, 160).
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This action of Perry 'vas never authorized or ratified by
the directors of defendant and comes squarely within the
following cases :
Aggeller & Musser v. Blood, 75 Utah 120, 272 Pa.c.
933.

J a.ckson

Y.

Bonneville Irr. Co. 66 Utah 404, 243 Pac.

107.

Electrical Products v. El. Camp, Inc., 105 Mont. 386,
73 Pac. (2d) 199.
Kelly Y. Galloway, 156 O:r:e. 301, 68 Pac. (2d) 474
and 66 Pac. (2d) 272.
Earl v. Roberts Fuel Oil, 147 Ore. 646, 35 Pa.c. (2d)
238.
Smith v. Steele Motor Co., 53 Ida. 238, 22 Pac. (2d)
1070.
Perry had the auditors on September 3, 1946, set up
the initial entries for the new corporation. In doing so
he had an entry made showing an account payable to
Sher Khan in the sum of $18,588.83. Mr. Duke testif~ed
that this was done by direction of Perry.
This did not satisfy the statute of frauds.
New Jersey Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bersick,
119 N.J. Law 68, 194 Atl. 438.
Taylor v. R. D. Scott & Co., 149 Mich. 525, 113 N.W.

32.
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Asbury v. Hugh L. Bates·Lodge No. 686 F. & A.M.,
62 Ohio App. 430, 24 N. E. (2d) 638.
Particularly is that true when the individual making
the entries or causing them to be made is the individual
who is being benefitted thereby. Perry was acting for
himself, in his own interests, casting his liabilities on the
company.
Western Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated,
57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664.
Lois Grunow Memorial Clinic v. Davis, 49 Ariz. 277,
66 Pac. (2d) 238.
Elggren v. Woolley, 64 Utah 183, 228 Pac. 906, quoting from 14 (a) C.J ., sec. 1891, p. 122.
If the corporation was to be bound by any such procedure it would have required some action by the Board
of Directors. Perry could not a.ct for the company in a
matter in which his interests were adverse.
A manager or president may not saddle his personal liabilities onto a corporation unless the board of
directors wills it so.
No one testified that Sher Khan knew anything about
these transactions. The record is absolutely silent as to
any communication to him or from him. He did not
testify in the case. He had no communication from defendant corporation.
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He had a payment from corporate funds. This is
not sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The
most that can be said for it is that Perry was paying
company funds that ''Tere "subject to" the liability.
The defendant objected to all of this evidence. The
objection should haYe been sustained. (R. 128.)
There is one more piece of evidence which may be
considered at this time, to-"\Yit, Exhibit "C ", from independent auditors addressed to the corporation, referring to the Sher Khan obligation as having been assumed
by the corporation.
This letter was not addressed to plaintiff nor was
it signed by defendant. It was pure heresay.
It does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Such a
writing must be a writing subscribed to by the defendant
corporation, not a letter to it by someone else.
Defendant's objection to this evidence should have
been sustained.
1Iuch of plaintiff's evidence was directed to an effort.
to reconcile the opening entries as made by Perry with
the opening entries which he was authorized to make by
the· directors. The fact still remained that the directors
never authorized Perry to assume his own obligations on
behalf of the corporation, and it would have taken corporate action to create such a liability.
If Perry had testified, which he did not, that there
was an agreement that the company should assume this
53

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

liability, the entries made pursuant to such- agreement
would have been competent to substantiate the fact that
the agreement was being carried out, but standing alone
in direct opposition to the action of the Board as to
what its opening entries should be, they were without
authorization, and incompetent. They are not evidence
of the promise.
The court found that Perry, as president and manager, had authority to make these entries and payment
on account. No one testified to any such authority. A
manager or president has no implied authority to deal
for his corporation in a matter involving his own affairs,
which this was. He was causing a corporation to assume
and pay his note. It would take express action of the
Board of Directors to bind the corporation in a matter
of that kind, as we see from the foregoing authorities.
Nor can Sher Khan say that he was in any way misled. He did not testify that he ever heard of any such
agreement. In fact, he did not testify at all. Had not
the court erroneously eliminated such evidence by sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's affirmative
defenses as heretofore presented, the real merits of his
situation as a creditor would have been developed. He
knew that Perry, his debtor, was president and manager
of defendant; hence could not act for the corporation on
the matter of assuming his debt. As a business man he
should have had his situation clarified at the time. If
the corporation was to assume it he should have received
a commitment from the corporation to that effect; otherwise he should have taken prompt action to see that the
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transaction was not consummated until he 'vas satisfied.
He did neither. His situation called for action on his
part before others became involved with their money.
This is a much stronger case of notice of lack of authority
than was held to be such in Compton v. Jensen, 78 Utah
55, 1 Pac. (2d) 242, "rhere this court held that the fact
that the owner of property acted as Notary Public on a
release of mortgage was notice that he was acting without authority.
Under both provisions of the statute there must be
some testimony to the effect that there was an agreement.
To comply with one provision it must be in writing,
authorized, and to comply with the other it may be oral,
but an agreement to assume liability is necessary in
both cases. The agreement' or undertaking is the foundation of both.
Mere receipt of property is not sufficient in either
case.
But assuming, without admitting, that this evidence
was sufficient, it was all destroyed and rendered void
when, as hereinafter presented, the court decreed it to he
void and of no effect and unenforceable as to plaintiff, in
the second cause of action. If it was void it was not
valid and could not have been a valid and binding contract as found by the court to be such on this cause of
action.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AS A
FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COMPLIANCE WITH
THE BULK SALES LAW AND THAT THE SALE
BY PERRY TO DEFEND ...L\.NT WAS VOID, AND
. THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT RECEIVE HIS PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE PROPERTY CONVEYED WHICH WAS SUBJECT TO THE B'ULK
SALES LAW; AND IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE SALE WAS VOID; AND
I.N ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.
Now let us take a look at the second cause of action
· (second count).
The trial court found as a fact that the defendant
failed to require compliance with the Bulk Sales Law
and further found the following detailed facts: That defendant failed to demand the statement from Perry; that
it failed to notify creditors; that it failed to cause the
purchase money to be prorated; that plaintiff had no
notice of the sale; that the sale was fraudulent and void;
that plaintiff considered the sale fraudulent; and void;
and that $3,588.83 was not the proportionate share of
the purchase price to which plaintiff was entitled.
The issue as to whether defendant did or did not
compiy with the Bulk Sales. Laws was raised by defendant's second cause of action and by defendant's denial
in its answer.
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The subject matter as to \vhether defendant did or
did not comply with the Bulk Sales La\v was never mentioned in the case. There is no reference to it in the pretrial conference record or in any of the testimony.

.

Plaintiff contented himself 'vith defendant's allegation in its first affirmative defense that no compliance
\vith that la\Y "\vas necessary because all creditors were to
be paid by Perry from the fund provided for his use in
doing so.
That affirmative allegation that compliance was not
necessary did not do away with the defendant's denial of
plaintiff's allegation. When the trial court sustained
plaintiff's demurrer to that affirmative defense it ceased
to exist as an issue and there remained only plaintiff's
allegation and defendant's denial.

An allegation that no compliance was necessary is
certainly not an admission, in the presence of a denial,
that there was no compliance.
The court will search in vain for any evidence on
this subject.
This cause of action, therefore, must fail for lack
of evidence to support the findings.
Let us, however, consider the matter a little further
as a matter of academic interest and see where it leads
us.
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The Bulk Sales Law is as follows:
''33-2-1. Purchaser Must Demand List of Creditors.
It shall be the duty of every person who shall
bargain for or purchase any portion of a stock of
goods, wares or merchandise in bulk otherwise
than in the ordinary course of trade and in the
regular and usual prosecution of the seller's
business, or an entire stock of merchandise in
bulk, or any portion of the property, furniture,
fixtures, equipment or supplies of a hotel, restaurant, barber shop or other business, used in carrying on such business, otherwise than in the regular
course of trade, before paying to the seller any
part of the purchase price thereof, or delivering
any promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness therefor, to demand of and receive from
such seller a sworn statement in writing, substantially as hereinafter provided, of the names and
address of all the creditors of the seller, together
with the amount of the indebtedness due or owing by the seller to each of his creditors, and it
shall be the duty of the seller to furnish such
statement, which shall be verified by oath to substantially the following effects : * * * ''
Plaintiff proceeds upon the theory that by this
statute all of the assets conveyed by Perry to the corporation were subject to that statute. The trial court
adopted that theory and only upon that basis could it
have found that the sum paid to plaintiff ($3588.83) did
not represent its fair proportion of the assets subject to
the Bulk Sales Law. Therein the court erred.
The Bulk Sales Law makes fraudulent and void only
the sale of such property as is subject to that law. Sales
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of other property are valid unless a creditor can invalidate them upon other g-rounds not alleged in this
rase. It is therefore important to determine what assets
"~hich 'Yere conveyed are c.overed by the statute.
Prior to 1923 our statute had been construed by this.
court as having no applicability to property other than
a stock of goods, wares and merchandise.
Swanson v. DeVine, 49 Utah 1; 160 Pac. 872.
In 1923, after decision of the Swanson case, the legislature amended the statute to include "any portion of
the furniture, fixtures, equipment or supplies of a hotel,
restaurant, barber shop or other business, used in carrying on such business. ''
It is defendant's contention that the Bulk Sales Law
as thus amended does not apply to the following assets
of Perry included in the conveyance to defendant:
Real Estate ----------------------------$135,000.00
Accounts Receivable ------------ 36,768.7 4
1,010.82
Prepaid Insurance -------------Deposit-State Ins. Fund ___ _
100.00
50.00
Meter Deposit

$162,929.56
It is plaintiff's contention, which was adopted by the
tria1 court, that the 1923 amendment affects all property
of every business being sold other than in the ordinary
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course of business. It is the contention of defendant that
the purpose of the 1923 ame~dm_ent was to bring within
the statute the property, furniture, fixtures, equipment
and supplies of hotels, restaurants, barber shops and
other businesses of a similar nature where such supplies
and equipment are used to carry on such business; that
it was not the purpose of the amendment to bring within
the statute all property of all sellers.
Let us take two concrete examples to illustrate the
point. Utah has become an industrial and distributing
point for the intermountain country. Would it be contended, for example that every time ZCMI, Cudahy Packing Coinpany, Geneva Steel, Utah Power & Light, Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, Western Union, or
one .of our transportation agencies, sells a piece of its
real property that it must comply with the Bulk Sales
Law? Utah is also a great mining· State. Would it be
contended that every time l{ennecott Copper, A. S. & R.,
or United States Smelting & Refining Company sell~ a
portion of its mining ground that it must comply with
the Bulk Sales Law? Of course the legislature never
intended by the 1923 amendment to accomplish any such
ridiculous result, and .yet by the interpretation given to
this statute by the trial court as the law of this State,
no corporation or individual, large or small, regardless
of its state of solvency, may sell any portion of its property used i.n carrying on. i.ts business without complying
with the Bulk Sales Law.
We submit that the 1923 amendment has no such
effect, and that the only portion of the property of Perry
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conveyed to the corporation 'vhich was subject to the
Bulk Sales Law was the stock of goods, 'vares, and merchandise of the agreed value of $15,000.00. It will readily
be seen that such amount prorated to common creditors in
the sum of $131,500 left plaintiff in fact overpaid.
The 1923 amendment should be construed in accordance with the intention ~f the legislature. Bulk Sales
Laws are in derogation of the constitutional right to
transfer property and transact business through free
right of contract, and are strictly construed. The principal asset of Perry conveyed to the corporation was the
real estate, having an agreed value of $135,000.00. It is
this property which is mainly involved in the interpretation of the Bulk Sales Law. Courts have uniformly
held that real estate, accounts receivable, and other intangibles do not come within the provisions of the Bulk
Sales Laws affecting goods, wares and merchandis_e,
fixtures, etc.
Re Elliott (1942), 48 Fed. Supp. 146.
Ventrilla v. Tortorice, (La.) 107 So. 390.
Farrell v. Paulus, 309 Mich. 441, 15 N.W. (2d) 700
Hall v. Corrine, (Tex.) 230 S. W. 823.
37 c. J. s. 1337.
Nelson v. Sherwood, (Ill.) 258 Ill. App. 168.
Peterson v. Freeburn, 204 Ia. 644, 215 N. W. 746.
Hood Rubber v. Dickey, 167 Okla. 304, 29 Pac. (2d)
115.
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Plaintiff, however, contends that because our legis.lature by the 1923 amendment included ''or any portion
of the pr~perty, furniture, fixtures, equipment or supplies of a hotel, restaurant, barber shop or other business used in carrying on such business'' that the legislature intended thereby to comprehend all property of
every business used for the purpose of carrying on such
business. This amendment has to do with only the property, furniture, fixtures, equipment and supplies of a
hotel, restaurant, barber shop or other business.
That it was the intention of the Legislature to bring
within the Bulk Sales Law only fixtures of certain types
of b"\].siness and not to make the law all-inclusive is clearly manifest from a reading of the title to the 1923 am~nd
ment, as follows :
''An act relating to the sale in bulk of merchandise, furniture, fixtures, or equipment of
stores, hotels, restaurants, barber shops, or any
place of. business wherein the furniture, fixtures
or equipment so sold in bulk are used in carrying
on said business." (Laws of Utah 1923, page 172.)
Had the Legislature intended to include all property
of every kind by every business of any kind, it would
not have so limited its applicability to particular kinds
of property of particular types of business.
This type of statute comes clearly within the rule of
statutory construction adopted by this court in the recent
case. of Perris vs. Perris, 202 Pac. ( 2d) 731.
See also Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Mining Co., 69 Utah
41, 252 Pac. 276, where this court refused to construe
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general language of the usury law in accordance with
broad language in violation of the clear intent of the
Legislature, and in doing so used the following strong
language:
''It is true that it is the duty of courts to en-~
force the plain intent of the statute when the
parties entitled to the benefit of the statute ask
for its protection. Courts do not, however, and
ought not, so interpret a legislative act that the
property of one citizen is forfeited and lost to
another, unless the plain and unequivocal mandate
of the Legislature admits of no other construction.''
The Legislature did not expressly include real property of all business concerns and expressly understood
that it was including only fixtures and other similar p-rop-erty of certain limited types of business.
This rule of statutory construction was also applied
in State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 Pac. (2d) 955, where
this court said :
''By the rules of construction the relative or
qualifying words are to be applied to the words
immediately preceding or following, unless the
legislative intent is indicated that a different application be made. 59 C. J. 985. ''
It is a uniform rule of statutory construction that
where the words ''or other business'' follow a specific
enumeration of particular types of business, that the
statute is construed to mean other businesses of a similar type to those which are specifically enumerated, which
defendant is not. That this was the intention of the legis63
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lature is made clearly manifest by the fact that it added
after the words ''or other business,'' the wor d s " use d.In
carrying on such business.'' It was the· clear intent of
the legislature to bring within the purview of the Bulk
Sales Law furniture, fixtures, and equipment in business
establishments where the furniture, fixtures, and equipment are the principal assets which are used in the conduct of the business. In fact the entire amendment shows
on its face that it was intended to accomplish exactly
that result. Also, the words ''or any portion of the
property'' are expressly limited to that type of business.
In the case of Mattecheck v. Pugh, 153 Ore. 1, 55
Pac. {2d) 730, it was attempted to bring apartme.nt house
equipiD:ent within the Bulk Sales Law, which applied to
''all of the fixtures or equipment used, or to be used, in
the sale, display, manufacture, care, or delivery of goods,
wares, or merchandise,. including movable store or office
fixture~, wagons,. auto trucks or other vehicles,'' because the statute expressly stated that it applied when~ver th~reby substantially the entire business or trade
theretofore conducted by the vendor shall be sold or
conveyed. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that such
general language "must be deemed to have reference
to the· kinds of business defined in the other parts of the
statute; that is, to businesses engaged in the sale, display,
manufacture, care or delivery of goods, wares and merchandise,'' and refused to extend the statute beyond the
intention of the legislature.
I

The rule of ejusdem generis applies to the 1923
~mendment, and the statute should be held to apply only
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to sales of goods, "'"ares and merchandise and to fixtures,
equipment, furniture, and other property of a similar
type, of hotels, restaurants, barber shops and other businesses of a similar type.
In the case of Kirkley v. Portland Electric Power
Co., 136 Ore. 421, 298 Pac. 237, the court, in construing
a statute, said the following:
''In construing this provision of the statute,
""e apply the rule of ejusdem generis, in accordance wherewith such terms as 'other,' 'other
thing,' 'others,' or 'any other,' when preceded by
a specific enumeration, are commonly given a
restricted meaning and limited to articles of the
same nature as those previously described. 25
R.C.L. 997, sec. 240, note 18; 36 Cyc. 1120, note 45. ''
In White v. Moore, 46 Ariz. 48, 46 Pac. (2d) 1077, a
provision of the income tax law was involved and the
question was as to the classification to which the taxpayer belonged. The rule of statutory construction was
announced to the effect that under the rule of ejusdem
generis whenever the general words ''or any other
business'' follo'v a particular enumeration of types of
activities, that those general words are intended to
mean other kinds similar to those specifically named.

This, in effect, is "\vhat this court did in the Swanson
case when it refused to include equipment and small
incidental articles like rubber heels, shoe laces, etc.,
within the provisions of our original bulk sales law. See
also Farrell v. Paulos, 309 Mich. 441, 15 N. W. (2d) 700.
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Where a sale or transfer of property is made, part
of which is within the statute and part without the
statute, the statute affects only the validity of the transfHr of that portion of the property which is covered by
the statute. 37 C.J.S., Sec. 481 (f), under Fraudulent
Conveyances.
Texas Hide & Leather Company v. Bonds, et al, 155
Okla. 3, 8 :Pac. (2d) 20.
See also 50 Am. Juris. 244, Sec. 249 "Statutes."
We respectfully submit that the second cause of
action cannot be sustained for the following reasons:
1.
That there was no evidence .to the effect that
there was no compliance with the Bulk Sales Law.
2. That the Bulk Sales Law has no applicability to
the major portion of the assets conveyed, and that the
payment which plaintiff received was more than he
would have been entitled to under.the Bulk Sales Law as
a common creditor of Perry as applied to the portion of
the assets subject to the Bulk Sales Law.
3. That the finding of the trial court that the sale
was fraudulent and void is repugnant to and destroyed
by the finding and judgment of the trial court in the first
cause of action that such sale was valid, and that plaintiff, by reason thereof, wa.s entitled to recover on the
basis of a valid assumption by defendant of plaintiff's obligation, as elsewhere in this brief presented.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED.IN MAKING AND
ENTERING INCONSISTENT, REPUGNANT AND
SELF-DESTRUCTIVE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENTS ON THE
TWO SEPARATE COUNTS.
The trial court then did the most remarkable thing
of all:
1. It found as a fact that the sale was valid and
that plaintiff 'vas entitled to the benefit thereof as a
third party beneficiary, and concluded as a matter of
law the defendant was by express agreement indebted to
plaintiff on the note on the first cause of action.

2. It found as a ·fact that the sale was fraudulent
and void and concluded as a matter of law that defendant
was indebted to plaintiff on the same note on the second
cause of action because the agreement was invalid; that
the transfer and sale to defendant corporation by Perry
was fraudulent and void as to plaintiff; that the· value of
the assets transferred by Per~y was in excess of the
amount of debts owed by Perry and more than sufficient
to pay all creditors in full with interest and attorneys
fees;
3. Ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff on each
cause of action ;
4. Entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on each
cause of action separately.
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Defendant respectfully submits that the findings of
fact, conclusions of law and judgments are inconsistent,
irreconcilable, repugnant to each other, and self-destructive.
Assuming, without admitting, that these two causes
of action are but separate counts of the same cause of
action, there is still only one cause of action, calling for
only one set of facts, and one conclusion of law therefrom, upon the basis of which only one judgment may be
entered.
Pike v. Clark, 95 Utah 235, 79 Pac. (2d) 1010.
In Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. (2d)
697, 128 Pac. (2d) 357, the court states:
''These arguments are all predicated upon a
fundamental fallacy. They assume that there can
be a piecemeal disposition of the several counts
of a complaint. They assume, when there is more
than one count in a complaint, and a demurrer is
interposed and sustained, and a judgment of dismissal entered, that there are as many separate
judgments a.s there are counts in the complaint.
That is not the law. There cannot be a separate
judgment as to one count in a complaint containing several counts. On the contrary, there can be
but one judgment in an action no matter how
many counts the complaint contains. (De Vally
v. Kendall de Vally 0. Co., Ltd. 220 Cal. 742,
32 P. 2d 638; Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal. 2d 617, 55 P.
2d 1174; Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
130 Cal. App. 510, 20 P. 2d 129. In the DeVally
ca.se, supra, a demurrer was sustained a.nd a
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judgment entered dismissing t'vo counts of a
four count complaint. The court held that the
judgment "~as premature, and dismissed the appeal from it, and stated ( 220 Cal. at page 745, 32
P. 2d at page 639): 'Although the matter is not
mentioned by counsel for either side, it appears
that the court should not have given a judgment
herein until the final disposition of the entire
cause. The la"T contemplates but one final judgment in a cause. As stated in the case of Nolan v.
Smith, 137 Cal. 360, 361, 70 P. 166, quoting from
Stockton, etc., Works v. Glen's Falls Ins. Co., 98
Cal. (557) 57'7, 33 P. 633: There can be but one
final judgment in an action, and that is one which,
in effect, ends the suit in the court in which it was
entered, and finally determines the rights of the
parties in relation to the matter in controversy.' "
Also, see Lutyen v. Ritchie, 37 Idaho 473, 218 Pac.
430.

The facts found by the court to sustain that cause of
action must be consistent and not repugnant and selfdestructive.
If the facts found are repugnant to each other they
are self destructive and amount to no findings of fact,
and will not sustain either judgment, or both judgments.
On the first cause of action the court found that there
was a valid contract or undertaking on the part of defendant to pay this note, and that it received property of
Perry in consideration of a promise to apply that property to plaintiff's liability against Perry. The consideration for that promise on defendant's part, so the court
found, was the conveyance of these assets. If that was
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true the transation could not be fraudulent. invalid and
void.
By its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment on the second cause of action, the transaction which
was the basis for the first cause of action was held to be
null and void as to plaintiff. If that was true it could
not have been valid and binding.
How can both of these propositions be true1
This court has had occasion to examine and discuss the situation wherein material findings are inconsistent with each other in the case of Independent Oil
& Gas Co. v. Shelton, et al, 79 Utah 384, 6 Pac. (2d) 1027.
Th trial court made a finding that a defendant had knowledge of the existence of a certain mortgage and also
that the same defendant had no knowledge of the covenants contained in the same mortgage. This court, in
setting aside one of the findings, stated :
"Having reached the conclusion upon this
record that, the court below properly found that
at the time the property was conveyed to the
Shell Oil Company it had no knowledge of the
covenants contained in plaintiff's mortgage restricting the use of the property, it must follow
that any finding inconsistent with the finding
thus approved must give way to the finding which
is in accord with the evidence. In a suit of equity,
where findings are inconsistent with each other,
and one of such findings is supported by the evidence, the l~tter finding will be set aside~ Sandberg v. Victor Gold & Silver Mining Co., 24 Utah
1, 66 P. 360. The finding that the Shell Oil Company knew of the existence of plaintiff's mortgage
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on September 3, 1929, "'hen the deed from Mr.
and Mrs. Shelton was delivered to the Shell Oil
Company, is disapproved and set aside.''
It will be noted that the foregoing was an equity case.
In a case at la·w. the judgment cannot stand.
In Rand v. Columbian Realty Co., et al, 13 Cal. App.
444, 110 Pa.c. 322, one count of complaint in an action to
recover money alleged that defendants obtained the
money under a scheme to defraud through an agent or
title-holding branch, and alleged an express promise of
repayment, and another count was in indebitatus assumpsit alleging indebtedness to plaintiff for money had and
received, with an allegation of an express promise to
repay it, the amount being the same in both counts. The
court found against plaintiff on the first count, which
involved a.ll facts upon which an agency might be predicated, and found for plaintiff on the second count, which
finding could only be supported on the theory that the
court determined under the evidence that the money was
received fraudulently, or by means of some agent or representative. The appellate court, in holding the two
findings inconsistent, stated:
''All presumptions are in favor of the correctness of the findings of the trial court and its conclusion. The .finding that the money was received
as alleged in the complaint, and the co~plaint
alleging a contract of repayment, can only be supported upon the theory that the court determined
under the evidence that the money was received
fraudulently and through misrepresentation, or
by means of some agent or representative as
above suggested. This finding, howev~r, which it
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must be presumed the court based upon the evidence in the record, is entirely inconsistent with
the other finding in connection with the first cause
of action which related to the same facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. These
two findings are. so at variance that a reversal
of the judgment is made necessary.''
Also in the case of Darrah v. Lang, 119 Cal. App.
552, 6 Pac. ( 2d) 989, the same court stated:
''The effect of the finding that the transfer
was made with intent to defraud the creditors of
the plaintiff is to render the deed valid and binding. It required a decree holding that the defendant
is the owner of the property in fee. By necessary
implication, it is a determination that the plaintiff
has no right, title or interest in the land.
''The court, however, adopted another finding
to the effect that the defendant holds the title to
the property in question, in trust, to secure the repayment of claims for specified sums of money
which were found to be due from the plaintiff to
the grantee. If the defendant merely holds the
property in trust to secure the payment of these
claims, the deed becomes a mortgage, and the legal
title remains in the plaintiff. In that event the
plaintiff had a right to an adjudication that he is
the owner of the legal title to the property subject
to the lien as security for the payment of the defendant's claims. 51 C. J. 267, sec. 255. These
inconsistent findings may not be harmonized.
They are in irreconcilable conflict. One of them
holds that the defendant is the legal owner of the
property. The other one determine~ that he merely holds an equitable title therein to secure the
payment of certain ascertained claims. It is impossible to say which finding should control the
court in rendering the judgment.
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"v'There material findings are in irreeonc.ila ble conflict, it becomes necessary to reverse the
judgment. 2 Cal Jr. 1030, sec. 612; Boyle v. Boyle,
97 Cal. App. 703, 276 Pac. 118; Ruling v. Seceombe, 88 Cal. App. 238, 263 Pac. 362. ''
I{nudson Y. Adams, et al, 137 Cal. App. 261, 30 Pac.
(2d) 608; Henderson et ux Y. Nixon, 66 Ida. 730, 168 Pac.
(2d) 594.
If the contract alleged in the first cause of action
was binding on defendant, for the use and benefit of
plaintiff, and plaintiff was claiming and demanding and
recovering as a third party beneficiary on the basis of
the first cause of action, it could not have been a fraudulent
and void transaction as found to be the fact and as decreed by the court in the second cause of action. If that
contract was ever made it occurred during July or August 1946, before the note b~came due. It either occurred
or it did not. If it did occur then plaintiffi's claim was
taken care of by assumption of liability on the part of
defendant.
On the other hand, if that contract was fraudulent
and void as to plaintiff, and if plaintiff regarded it as
such, as found by the court in the second cause of action,
it could not be a valid consideration for a contract for
the benefit of plaintiff in the first cause of action.
Plaintiff cannot legally enforce contract for his
benefit, which he himself repudiates as fraudulent and
void and which he has the court decree to he void.
Kinney v. Yoelin Bros., 76 Colo. 136, 230 Pac. 127.
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Coleman v. Costello, 115 Kan. 463, 223 Pac. 289.
C. J. S. 1328, Sec. 478 Fraud. Con.
Wolfe v. Bellfuir Hat Co., 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 908 .

. The principles announced by this court in the Bastian, Powell and Covey Ballard cases, supra, are equally
applicable to findings and judgment.

Let us bear in mind that plaintiff is the one who is
endeavoring in this proceeding to have the transaction .~
declared to be both valid and invalid. He is the one who
seeks to enforce· the contract in the first cause of action J
.
and invalidate it in the second cause of action.

·j

~

These are all specific findings of fact. It is not a
case of inconsistency between specific and general findings. They are all specific and diametrically opposed to
each other and self-destructive. This court may not say
which was right and which was wrong, nor may this ,
court in this case make its own findings of fact. This is ·

a law case for collection of a note upon which defendant .~.•.,:
either is or is not liable.
:J
We respectfully submit that these findings, con..
elusions and judgments cannot stand.
RICH AND ELTON,
Attorneys for .Appellant.
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